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ABSTRACT
Objectives: We aimed to evaluate whether a large-
scale two-phase quality improvement programme
achieved its aims and to characterise the influences on
achievement.
Setting: National Health Service (NHS) in England.
Participants: NHS staff.
Interventions: The programme sought to (1) develop
a shared national, regional and locally aligned safety
focus for 4 high-cost, high volume harms;
(2) establish a new measurement system based on a
composite measure of ‘harm-free’ care and (3) deliver
improved outcomes. Phase I involved a quality
improvement collaborative intended to involve 100
organisations; phase II used financial incentives for
data collection.
Measures: Multimethod evaluation of the
programme. In phase I, analysis of regional plans
and of rates of data submission and clinical
outcomes reported to the programme. A concurrent
process evaluation was conducted of phase I, but
only data on submission rates and clinical outcomes
were available for phase II.
Results: A context of extreme policy-related
structural turbulence impacted strongly on
phase I. Most regions’ plans did not demonstrate full
alignment with the national programme; most fell
short of recruitment targets and attrition in
attendance at the collaborative meetings occurred
over time. Though collaborative participants saw the
principles underlying the programme as attractive,
useful and innovative, they often struggled to convert
enthusiasm into change. Developing the
measurement system was arduous, yet continued to
be met by controversy. Data submission rates
remained patchy throughout phase I but improved in
reach and consistency in phase II in response to
financial incentives. Some evidence of improvement
in clinical outcomes over time could be detected but
was hard to interpret owing to variability in the
denominators.
Conclusions: These findings offer important
lessons for large-scale improvement programmes,
particularly when they seek to develop novel
concepts and measures. External contexts may exert
far-reaching influence. The challenges of developing
measurement systems should not be underestimated.
INTRODUCTION
How best to ensure the safety of patients con-
tinues to challenge health systems world-
wide.1–3 Recent years have seen multiple
efforts to secure improvements. Some have
multiple safety targets and seek generalised
strengthening of organisational systems, pro-
cesses and cultures,4–6 while others target
speciﬁc areas of harm or practice.7–9
Whatever their form, improvement pro-
grammes typically measure outcomes one by
one, with incidence for each—for example,
central venous catheter bloodstream infec-
tions or unplanned readmissions to hospital
—reported singly and separately, rather than
in terms of how many harms each person
suffered. Most also focus on speciﬁc, well-
bounded healthcare settings and measure
harms that are assumed to be attributable to
the care provided in those environments.
Some (though not all) patient safety pro-
grammes have reported welcome successes in
relation to speciﬁc harms. From the patient’s
perspective, however, a focus on single out-
comes in well-bounded healthcare settings
may be deﬁcient, potentially obscuring
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The multimethod design enabled a holistic
evaluation.
▪ The study reveals the impact of policy and struc-
tural turbulence on ability to achieve change in
health systems.
▪ The importance of a rigorous development phase
for improvement programmes, including signifi-
cant investment upfront in measurement and
data systems, was identified.
▪ The process evaluation of the first phase of the
programme may have been biased towards those
with more positive views.
▪ Independent data on clinical outcomes were not
available, and the evaluation thus relied on data
collected by the programme itself.
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individuals’ experiences across pathways of care and
their exposure to concatenations of multiple adverse
events.10 Addressing harms singly also has other unin-
tended consequences, including the reinforcement of
disciplinary boundaries. Infection control nurses may,
for example, work in isolation from tissue viability nurses
with the same patients. Thus, a potentially more useful
approach to safety might focus on the extent to which
patients escape all possible harms and could thus be
deemed to have experienced care that is ‘harm-free’. In
this article, we report a study of a large-scale programme
seeking to promote an innovative approach to harm-free
care in England.
THE HARM-FREE CARE PROGRAMME
Run as part of the Department of Health’s Quality,
Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) ‘Safe
Care’ workstream,11 the programme was led by a dedi-
cated national programme team and had three major
goals:
▸ Develop a shared national, regional and locally
aligned safety focus for four high-cost, high volume
harms (venous thromboembolism (VTE), pressure
ulcers, urinary tract infection in patients with urinary
catheters and falls). These four harms were selected
because they account for a large proportion of all
avoidable injury to patients and share many under-
lying factors (eg, mobility, medication management,
nutrition, hydration) relating to basic patient care, yet
may involve trade-offs in managing risk.1 12
▸ Establish a measurement system based on the prin-
ciple that a new patient-centred measure that would
‘bundle’ harms into a single, composite score of
harm-free care would bring new insights into harm
rates, enable clinical teams to identify and recognise
where problems lay and motivate local improvement.
▸ Deliver improved clinical outcomes, with a speciﬁc
objective of ensuring that 95% of patients would be
harm-free.
The programme did not seek to develop new tech-
nical interventions for managing the four harms nor to
set targets, but instead sought to ensure that addressing
the four harms together for each patient was identiﬁed
as a priority for organisations, to support organisations
and teams in implementing existing good practice in
relation to the four harms, and to provide a well-
founded means of surveillance, monitoring and feed-
back on harm-free care. It ran in two distinct phases.
The ﬁrst phase ran September 2010 to April 2012,
including a 3-month preparatory period at the begin-
ning (September 2010–December 2010) and a 6-month
maintenance period at the end (October 2011–April
2012). This ﬁrst phase sought to pilot an approach to
measuring and improving patient safety, to support a
cohort of organisations to implement and test it and
ultimately to prepare the way for the subsequent use of
the approach across all care settings in England. To
achieve these aspirations, the national team undertook
an intensive period of programme design, reﬁnement of
operational deﬁnitions, cycles of testing and learning
and developing and modifying a data collection tool for
harm-free care.
This tool, which came to be known as the National
Health Service (NHS) Safety Thermometer, sought to
enable collection of data that would be comparable at a
national level and useful in local improvement work13
and that would balance accurate measurement and stan-
dardised deﬁnitions with straightforward data collection
methods that did not burden staff. The design period
was followed by work to implement the programme
through regional and local partnerships (table 1), much
of it organised through a voluntary quality improvement
collaborative known as Safety Express.
Use of the collaborative model14 was based on the
theory that it would facilitate rapid shared learning and
the mobilisation of collective cross-multidisciplinary
action.15 Consistent with the BreakThrough Series col-
laborative approach,16 Safety Express involved three
learning events where participants across the regions
came together, and action periods during which partici-
pants were asked to implement improvement activities
(eg, setting up data collection systems and implementing
Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles). Participants were recruited
through the 10 strategic health authority (SHA) regions
then extant in the English NHS. Each region was asked
to engage 10 participating organisations serving a local
population, and each of these organisations was asked to
ensure that 10 staff members (primarily front-line clini-
cians) attended the learning events and that they tested
the NHS Safety Thermometer (NHS ST) in a relevant
caseload. The work of clinical teams in undertaking
these activities was supported by the regional and
national teams, as well as by online resources and
detailed guidance on good practice interventions and
on how to submit and interpret local data. Participating
organisations were asked to collect data on four wards
(acute) or on their caseloads (non-acute) on 1 day per
month using the NHS Safety Thermometer and to
submit it to a central data collection facility. A 6-month
maintenance period during which organisations were
asked to continue submitting data followed the comple-
tion of Safety Express in September 2011. Some support,
albeit limited, was available to organisations on request
during the maintenance period.
The second phase of the programme ran April 2012
to March 2013, when it expanded beyond the original
participants to include all settings providing care for
NHS patients in England. An important characteristic of
this phase is that ﬁnancial incentives through the
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN)
mechanism were offered to all NHS organisations in
England to submit data on 100% of patients on 1 day
per month using the NHS Safety Thermometer. Only
limited improvement support was available: the collab-
orative did not continue, though access to online
2 Power M, et al. BMJ Open 2016;6:e011886. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011886
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Table 1 Safety Express key deliverables and review points for regions, determined in advance
Baseline assessment Review 1 Review 2 Review 3 Final review
Safety Express phase reviews Maintenance phase review Incentivised phase review
Sept–Dec 2010 April 2011 Sept 2011 Sept 2012 March 2013
1. A named individual in
each region to link into
the national team,
appoint a local team
and link into the QIPP
team.
2. Identify areas of
alignment and
discourse between
local, regional and
national QIPP plans.
3. Recruit 10 host
organisations and
ensure team
composition included
locality partners.
4. Identify regional faculty
for a Safety Express
improvement
collaborative.
5. Field 100 people at
learning session 1 of
the collaborative.
1. Integration of the safe care
plans into the regional QIPP
plan.
2. Ten teams of 10 participating
in the collaborative.
3. Participation in fortnightly
WebEx meetings (regional
leaders)
4. Submission of monthly data
using the NHS Safety
Thermometer
5. Faculty support (‘national’
and ‘regional’—national
included subject matter
experts, ie, in tissue viability/
pressure ulcers and nutrition.
Regional—leading clinicians
and QI experts) to teams
between learning sessions
(WebEx/site visits/phone
calls).
1. Submission of five case
studies of ‘innovative
practice’ to the national
team.
2. Submission of monthly
data using the NHS Safety
Thermometer from each
organisation in the
collaborative.
3. Well-defined plans for
scale up to the remaining
organisations in the region,
including plans to work
collaboratively with
commissioners.
4. Identification of teams to
put forward for national
awards at a Summit event
at the end of the pilot.
5. Plans to publish the work.
1. All organisations in the region to
have participated in the CQUIN for
collecting NHS ST data monthly.
2. Engagement with Clinical
Commissioning Groups to raise
awareness of ‘harm-free’ care
programme and the NHS Safety
Thermometer CQUIN (eg,
attendance at the Safe Care work
stream meeting for commissioners,
attendance at CQUIN master
classes in which the details of the
CQUIN were explained to
commissioners from each region).
3. Review regional level data.
4. Publication of the results of the
QIPP Safe Care programme of
work.
5. Evidence of regional planning for
delivery of improvement for the
2013–2014 CQUIN.
1. All organisations participating
in the 2013–2014 CQUIN to
aim to achieve 50%
improvement in reduction of
the four harms by March
2014.
2. Evidence of the harm-free
care programme in Trust’s
Quality Accounts and/or
Trust Board reports.
3. All CCGs commissioning
harm-free care locally.
4. All CCGs and organisations
to have systems in place to
embed ‘harm-free’ care into
contracts and to embed into
the new NHS and social care
structures.
5. Evidence of support to assist
organisations who have not
achieved 50% improvement.
CCGs, Clinical Commissioning Groups; CQUIN: Commissioning for Quality and Innovation; NHS, National Health Service; NHS ST, NHS Safety Thermometer; QI, quality improvement; QIPP,
Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention.
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resources remained, and some limited support was avail-
able from the NHS Institute for Improvement and
Innovation up to March 2013. Some locally organised
(not nationally coordinated) support activity also took
place.
STUDY AIM
The available evidence suggests that large-scale pro-
grammes may offer some important advantages over
single-organisation efforts17 by supporting the infrastruc-
ture for improvement, including the development of well-
founded interventions and data systems18 as well as acti-
vating the social conditions, peer-norming effects and
shared learning most likely to foster change15 19 20 and
enabling change at scale. A growing body of evidence
now points to the features essential to the success of such
programmes, including shared goals among participants,
clinician engagement, clinical champions and the
importance of well-designed, theoretically sound inter-
ventions.5 19 21 22 However, large-scale improvement pro-
grammes continue to show a mixed picture of success,
with many reporting disappointingly modest (or no)
improvements in implementation of evidence-based
interventions in practice.23 24 These ﬁndings suggest that
much remains to be learnt about these complex interven-
tions,25 for example regarding contextual inﬂuences,26
programme design and implementation,27 measure-
ment28 29 and sustainability beyond project timelines.30
With the aim of addressing these gaps in knowledge
and improving the evidence-base for future large-scale
improvement programmes, particularly when they
involve novel approaches and measures, our study
sought to assess how far the harm-free programme met
its three aims and to identify and characterise the inﬂu-
ences on the achievement of these aims.
METHODS
We conducted a multimethod evaluation ‘wrapped
around’ the programme,31 rather than a research study
that set out to test speciﬁc hypotheses. During phase I of
the programme, we used a combination of data col-
lected by the programme itself and an independent
process evaluation. The programme data included an
analysis conducted by the national team of the extent to
which regional strategy was aligned to national goals,
information on the number of organisations that were
submitting data on the four harms and the data on
clinical outcomes (the four harms) submitted by partici-
pating organisations. As part of a wider study of quality
and safety in the NHS,32 we also conducted a concurrent
process evaluation of Safety Express (the quality
improvement collaborative that ran during phase I),
using interview, observational, questionnaire and docu-
mentary data. The process evaluation was used as part of
a convergent design directed towards obtaining different
but complementary data and thus developing a more
complete understanding of the programme at multiple
levels.33 Approval for the process evaluation was
obtained from an NHS Research Ethics Committee
(REC). Signed consent was obtained for interviews.
For reasons of resource, only the programme data on
submission rates and clinical outcomes submitted by the
participating organisations were available for phase II.
The organisations submitting data changed over time
(especially between phases 1 and 2), leading to denomi-
nators that increased in size and diversity over time.
Twelve organisations submitted data consistently from
January 2011 to March 2013, and these were subject to
subgroup analysis.
All quantitative data were collected and analysed by
the programme team; all qualitative data were collected
and analysed by an evaluation team independent of pro-
gramme team (tables 2 and 3). The data were analysed
separately and then synthesised thematically.34
RESULTS
The process evaluation, which focused on phase I only,
involved 24 interviews, 157 survey responses (table 4),
48 hours of observation and around 20 documents. Data
on clinical outcomes were submitted by participating
organisations over both phases on the programme,
though the composition of the contributing organisa-
tions and the consistency with which individual organisa-
tions submitted data varied over time (Figure 1A, B).
Quotations are numbered to indicate different partici-
pants and preserve anonymity.
Achievement of programme aim 1: develop a shared
national, regional and locally aligned safety focus for the
four harms
Evidence on the development of a shared national,
regional and locally aligned safety focus for the four
harms during phase I was assessed through an analysis
of the plans that regions submitted to the national pro-
gramme team. A mixed picture emerged. Substantial
variability (table 1) was evident in how well the regions’
plans were aligned with those of the national pro-
gramme. Only 2 of the 10 regions’ plans were rated as
‘green’ on the rating scale by September 2011 (almost
9 months after the start of the programme) and only
one organisation maintained this for over a year
(table 5).
All 10 regions signed up to participate in the Safety
Express collaborative, but only 2 were able to reach the
goal they were set of recruiting 10 participating organisa-
tions. Instead, regions recruited between 5 and 31 orga-
nisations. No site was able to consistently provide 100
participants at each learning event (the numbers attend-
ing ranged from 22 to 118), meaning that the goal of
enrolling 1000 front-line clinicians was not reached. In
seven regions, attrition occurred in the number of
4 Power M, et al. BMJ Open 2016;6:e011886. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011886
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Table 2 Quantitative data
Programme goal Data Analysis
Develop a shared national, regional and locally
aligned safety focus, assessed through inclusion of
the four harms in each region’s system-level strategy
plans and QIPP improvement programmes.
Each region’s progress extracted from plans and
mapped on four occasions using a categorical rating
scale, used to assess achievement of programme goal
of a shared national, regional and locally aligned safety
focus for the four harms.
A judgement was made by the programme team to
determine whether the region was achieving four or
more of the milestones (green), two to three (amber) or
one or less (red).
Develop a shared, national, regional and locally
aligned safety focus: participation in the collaborative,
delivery of the required programme outputs and NHS
Safety Thermometer data collection.
The number of participating organisations and the
number of attendees each region sent to each learning
session in Safety Express was recorded, used to
assess achievement of goal of a shared national,
regional and locally aligned safety focus for the four
harms.
Count data displayed as descriptive statistics and
percentages.
Establish a measurement system, assessed by
tracking number of sites submitting data over time.
Number of organisations submitting data on the four
harms.
Description.
Deliver improved clinical outcomes, assessed by
determining absence of all four harms at the individual
patient level
For each patient, data were collected by local clinicians
on four outcomes (pressure ulcers, falls, urinary tract
infection in patients with urinary catheters, and VTE)
and submitted using the NHS Safety Thermometer,
used to monitor progress towards the programme of
improved clinical outcomes.
To allow for variation in organisations submitting data
over time, two cohorts were formed:
1. Data from acute patients from the initial, phase I
Safety Express organisations consistently
submitting between January 2011 and March 2013
2. Data from acute patients from all organisations
submitting at any time between January 2011 and
March 2013.
The composite measure of harm-free care was plotted
over time using a control chart. To take account of
overdispersion, due to the large sample size, a P′ control
chart was used. Standard control chart rules were
applied to indicate special and common cause variation
and when a shift in the average occurred. Statistical
analysis was performed using R-2.15.1 for Windows
(http://cran.r-project.org/bin/windows/base/old/2.15.1/).
NHS, National Health Service; QIPP, Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention; VTE, venous thromboembolism.
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Table 3 Process evaluation (phase I only)
Method Data Analysis
Semistructured interviews. A prompt guide was used to
elicit experiences and views of the programme from
stakeholders who were purposively sampled to
represent different constituencies (eg, national, regional
and local). Participants were recruited through email
coordinated by the national team. Theoretical sampling
was not possible due to the nature of recruitment;
instead all those who agreed to be interviewed over a
defined time-frame were interviewed. It was not possible
to assess theoretical saturation formally. Interviews were
audio-recorded and transcribed.
Interviews with 7 QIPP national team members, 6 local
coordination leads and 11 programme participants. The
local programme coordination leads were more senior
nursing staff, located in 4 of the 10 Strategic Health
Authorities. The programme participants interviewed
were mainly nursing staff with responsibility for clinical
governance, tissue viability or patient safety and were
based in 8 of the 10 regions. These data were used to
assess influences on the programme’s achievement of
its goals of shared goals and establishment of a
measurement system.
Analysis was based on the constant comparative
method, facilitated by NVivo software.35 36 Open
codes were generated through close reading of
transcriptions. Reflection and interpretation were used
to produce a higher level of abstraction and thematic
categories. Coding of transcripts was supported by
NVIVO V.8 software.
Observations. Observers took detailed field notes and
held de-brief sessions, which were audio-recorded and
transcribed.
Ethnographic observations to assess the experience of
participating in the programme were conducted at Six
Safety Express learning events.
As above
Survey. On the basis of the observational and interview
data, an online survey was developed and circulated to
all learning event participants and through email contact
channels. Covering implementation of the programme,
data measurement and organisational involvement, the
majority of the 40 survey questions were multiple-choice
or Likert scale, with four free-text questions used to elicit
more in-depth responses.
The survey received 157 anonymised responses;
because of the method of email distribution, it was not
possible to calculate a response rate. A diverse
selection of respondents completed the survey
(table 4), reflecting those participating in the project.
These data were used to assess influences on the
programme’s achievement of its goals.
Descriptive analyses of the survey data, with free-text
responses coded using content analysis.37
Documents. Project documentation and key policy
documents were purposively sampled.
∼20 relevant documents, including policy materials,
were collected from the programme team and from
QIPP and other websites. These were used to gather
information about the programme and possible
contextual influences.
Review and summary.
QIPP, Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention.
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delegates attending the learning events as the pro-
gramme progressed.
Interviews showed that many (though not all) partici-
pants saw the principles underlying the programme as
attractive, useful and innovative. Much support was
expressed for the programme principle of taking a
holistic approach to harm: almost two-thirds (64%) of
survey participants strongly agreed or agreed that the
four harms chosen were the most important for their
organisation to address, and interview participants were
also generally positive about the approach to harm-free
care. Survey and interview data suggested that partici-
pants generally valued the collaborative features of the
programme, with the learning sessions and encourage-
ment from the national team seen as particularly useful.
Observations at the Safety Express learning sessions
found that participants demonstrated considerable
enthusiasm and that the sessions helped to build rela-
tionships and share learning, ideas and practical tools.
I mean we could bounce ideas off them, say we have
thought about this, is anybody else doing something
similar who we can talk to? So they have got that informa-
tion to signpost us. (Learning session participant I-05)
However, the ambition of the programme daunted
some participants. Just under half (44.6%) of survey
respondents reported that the programme was greeted
with ‘initiative fatigue’ in their organisation. Though
nearly three-quarters (73.2%) reported that achieving
‘harm-free’ care was a realistic goal for the NHS, just
over a third (34.8%) thought their organisation was
close to attaining it. Translating the enthusiasm
generated by collaborative activities into local action
remained a challenge for many.
The ethos of it is obviously just what it should be, but
how achievable it is I am not sure. (Learning session par-
ticipant I-06)
Brilliant for networking and we all left feeling positive
[…] it was the sustainability following the events [that
was] difﬁcult. Because obviously you leave the room full
of ideas and you go back to your everyday work and… it’s
very difﬁcult to keep it going, I have to say. (Learning
session participant)
The most profound inﬂuence on the ability of regions
and organisations to engage with the programme
appeared to be the context of extreme policy turbulence
and structural change. Documentary analysis of the
2009–2012 policy context (ﬁgure 2) identiﬁed the trans-
formations of the NHS architecture associated with the
Health and Social Care Act (2012), with the effects
evident before (in anticipation of) and after the passing
of the legislation. Alongside many changes, a new
national commissioning board was created (NHS
England) and the 10 Strategic Health Authorities were
replaced by 4 regional ofﬁces of NHS England. The
national bodies that had supported system change were
decommissioned (the NHS Institute in March 2013 and
the National Patient Safety Agency in June 2012). Loss
of senior leadership at the national and regional level
contributed to voids of coordination and communica-
tion during the programme. Interviews with the pro-
gramme showed that in all but one region, the problems
Table 4 Survey respondent characteristics
Site characteristic Descriptor Survey respondents* (%)
Organisation (n=133) Acute trust 63.9
Community trust 24.1
Mental health trust 2.3
Primary care trust 7.5
Strategic Health Authority 6.0
Other 4.6
Staff level banding† (n=134) Bands 1–4 0.7
Bands 5–6 10.4
Bands 7–8 61.9
Above Band 8 28.4
Other 2.1
Regional cluster (n=134) North 26.9
Midlands/East of England 26.9
London 6.7
South East Coast 9.7
South Central 21.6
South West 6.0
Prefer not to say 6.0
*Some respondents chose more than one option to describe their organisation, banding, and region.
†Most jobs in the NHS are covered by the AfC pay scales. This covers all staff except doctors, dentists and the most senior managers. The
AfC job evaluation system determines a point score, which is used to match jobs to one of the nine pay bands and determine levels of basic
salary (ref: http://www.nhscareers.nhs.uk/explore-by-career/nursing/pay-for-nurses/).
AfC, Agenda for Change; NHS, National Health Service.
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faced in delivering the programme caused by external
and internal turbulence necessitated implementation of
a recovery plan and the establishment of direct commu-
nication between the national team and the participat-
ing teams rather than through the regions.
Achievement of programme aim 2: establish
a measurement system to understand the burden
of the four harms
The programme largely succeeded in its aim of establish-
ing a measurement system, but interviews and observa-
tions showed that the process of its development was
effortful and it continued to generate considerable con-
troversy throughout the programme.
Figure 1 (A) Number of organisations submitting data over
time (NHS Trusts submitting NHS Safety Thermometer data
over time, from the start of the Safety Express programme
(‘phase I’) through to end of the first period of incentivised
data collection (‘phase II’). Bar height represents the total
unique NHS Trusts submitting within the month. In January
2011, 12 organisations submitted. In March 2013, this had
risen to 252 organisations). (B) Number of patient entries
submitted over time (Number of individual patient-level entries
submitted to the NHS Safety Thermometer over time from the
start of the Safety Express programme (‘phase I’) through to
end of the first period of incentivised data collection (‘phase
II’). Bar height represents the total patients submitted within
the month. In January 2011, 712 patients were surveyed and
their data were submitted against the ‘harm-free’ Care
measure. In March 2013, this was 98 372 patients).
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Interviews, documents and observations found that a
prototype of the NHS Safety Thermometer data collec-
tion tool was developed by the national programme
team during the design period of phase I and reﬁned
iteratively thereafter. Intended to be used by front-line
staff, who were asked to collect data on the four harms
by reviewing patients’ records and examining and speak-
ing to the patient harms,38 the tool enabled entry of
data through an online spreadsheet. It provided instant
data display for the participating clinical teams and,
through a merge function, supported aggregation to
give whole organisational, regional and national data
sets. Though rates of each of the four harms could be
viewed separately, a novel feature of the NHS Safety
Thermometer was its ability to generate a composite
measure of ‘harm-free’ care to indicate the proportion
of patients who had not experienced any of the four
harms.
During Safety Express, the 10 regions were asked to
coordinate collection of data using the NHS Safety
Thermometer from 10 organisations from their region.
Each of these 10 organisations was asked to collect data
and submit on four wards (acute) or caseloads (non-
acute) on 1 day per month. In interviews, many Safety
Express participants saw the NHS Safety Thermometer
as innovative, providing a useful and valuable data set
that could be used to drive improvements and provide
evidence of progress. They reported that the tool had
several advantages in comparison with some available
methods of measurement, including the potential that
the tool provided for intervening and improving care on
the spot. Some participants reported that working across
all four harms helped to avoid duplication, both of data
collection and effort.
The sheer number of nurses that have said: what is fabu-
lous about it is that it means that I can improve patient
care while the patient is right here, still in the bed and
still when I can do something about it […] When I did
the Safety Thermometer it was clear the [patient] had
not had a VTE assessment done so I got the junior
doctor to do it for them. (National team member I-22)
My understanding was that [the harms] selected themselves
really because they were the biggest category of avoidable
harms in healthcare and from that point of view I think they
were the right ones to focus on. (Local organiser I-05)
Some participants (including around 20% of survey
respondents) commented on the value of having shared
deﬁnitions and being able to collect comparable data on
harms across organisations.
The consistent approach across the country so we
measure apples and apples. (Survey)
Figure 2 Timeline of key political and policy events 2009–2012. GPs, general practitioners; NHS, National Health Service.
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[NHS Safety Thermometer] is the ﬁrst time that we have
actually been nationally able to measure something in the
same way to the same deﬁnition… I don’t think that has
happened in anywhere in Europe. (Local organiser I-15)
However, developing and deploying the NHS Safety
Thermometer was not without substantial challenges.
The time required to develop the tool was lengthy,
much greater than the programme team had initially
anticipated; modiﬁcations were still being made to the
data collection instrument late in 2011, almost
11 months after the start of the collaborative. Questions
and disagreement about the inclusion of the harms and
their exact deﬁnition dogged the development of the
programme, in particular, as shown by observations and
interviews, by introducing delays while consensus was
sought. This was particularly true of the inclusion of the
measure relating to urinary tract infection in patients
with urinary catheters, which some participants disputed
or reported was unclear. Over 1 in 10 (11.8%) of survey
respondents felt that the inclusion of this measure in
the programme was not soundly based in scientiﬁc evi-
dence, compared with just 2% feeling that there was no
scientiﬁc basis to include VTE.
I think the other thing with falls and pressure ulcers is
that there are quite clear deﬁnitions that everyone agrees
on. For catheter associated UTIs it has not been the
same… That has created quite a lot of confusion. (Local
organiser I-15)
Because of some of the questions around the measure-
ment piece, because of the questions around—well what
does the deﬁnition for UTI look like in my organisation
compared to yours? Very valid conversations but nonethe-
less quite stalling. (National team member I-18)
Some participants, for example in the sessions we
observed as well as in interviews, expressed a very strong
view that a national measurement strategy was neither
useful nor appropriate. Organisations and individuals
were often already using their own local deﬁnitions of
some or all of the four harms and had established
methods of data collection and data display (though
these were largely from incident reporting systems).
Participants did not always demonstrate consensus that
the four harms chosen by the programme were the most
important focus for improvement efforts in their own
organisations.
The difﬁculty with it is that if we’ve already got a system and
a process in place in some organisations to measure what
they’re doing against falls, pressure ulcers, whatever, indi-
vidually, the link hasn’t been there. (Local organiser I-24)
The number of updates to the tool over the course of
Safety Express in response to feedback caused some frus-
tration among participants, who did not always appreci-
ate the developmental nature of the ﬁrst phase of the
programme. Participants also reported, in interviews and
in the survey, that the tool was not as easy to use as
intended. The extent to which data collection would
need to be supported was initially underestimated by the
national team; some months in, they reported that it
became clear that there was a skills gap in relation to
measurement in many participants, who were often inex-
perienced in collecting or using data for improvement.
Documents and interviews showed that they produced a
suite of materials to support learning and implementa-
tion and delivered a series of learning workshops across
the country on measuring improvement, including tech-
nical capability (actual use of the data tool). In the
survey, half (50.0%) of respondents described the tool
as ‘straightforward’, but nearly half (44.3%) felt that
data collection was a major burden. Some teams
struggled to integrate the new data collection into their
existing practice.
It’s time-consuming. It’s another thing that a clinician
has to do. (Learning session participant I-01)
Around a third (32.6%) of survey respondents ques-
tioned the reliability of the data collected, indicating
that they believed that it was ‘vulnerable to “gaming” by
organisations trying to look good’ and that the data were
not comparable across organisations. One problem was
that the NHS Safety Thermometer asked data collectors
to record whether the harm was ‘old’ or ‘new’ depend-
ing on when it occurred. Staff reported that this was a
problem because of the way the tool seemed to obscure
where and how the harm had occurred and opened up
the possibility of blame.
But because it went down on our record, it looked as
though it was ours even though it goes down as an old or
a new, when you put those together it looks as though—
oh look, they have got pressure ulcers. (Learning session
participant I-06)
Substantial variability was evident in the extent to
which organisations used the NHS Safety Thermometer
during Safety Express (ﬁgure 1A, B). One region did
not submit any data. In the ﬁrst month, only 12 acute
organisations submitted data, making 712 patient-level
entries. Rates of organisational participation and data
submission increased thereafter, with 140 organisations
submitting data at least once and an average of 60 orga-
nisations contributing data every month throughout the
collaborative. A total of 52 309 patient-level line entries
were made during Safety Express. A majority (71%) of
monthly submissions contained at least 30 patients and
84% achieved at least 20 patients. Data from hospital set-
tings accounted for 90% of all data submitted, with the
remainder from non-acute settings including 3% from
the patients’ own home, 2% from nursing homes and
5% from other settings. Within hospitals, 50% of the set-
tings chosen by participants for testing in hospitals were
medical wards.
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During the second, incentivised data collection phase
of the programme, the number of organisations contri-
buting data increased dramatically: 719 organisations
used the NHS Safety Thermometer during 2012–2013
(146 acute, 573 non-acute). This resulted in a large
increase in patient entries into the data set: 1 882 558
patient entries (ﬁgure 1B). Diversity in the kinds of
organisations contributing data also increased during
2012–2013, with particular growth in the proportion of
patients from non-acute settings. Of the non-acute, 136
were independent provider sites and 217 were nursing
homes. During this period, 58.3% of data were submit-
ted from hospital settings, 7.8% from the patients’ own
home, 2.3% from nursing homes and 31.6% from other
settings.
Programme aim 3: deliver improved outcomes
The extent to which the programme met its aim of deli-
vering improved outcomes was difﬁcult to assess, given
variability in the number and consistency of organisations
submitting data over time. Control chart rules were used
to interpret data on harm-free care over the two phases
of the programme in the speciﬁc initial Safety Express
subgroup of 12 organisations who were the ﬁrst to join
(ﬁgure 3A) and, separately, all organisations (including
the initial Safety Express subgroup) (ﬁgure 3B).
The initial Safety Express subgroup organisations all
reported data consistently over time. The proportion of
harm-free care reported by these organisations rose
from 85.1% in January 2011 to 89.7% in April 2011
during Safety Express. This increased further to 91.4%
by March 2012 and remained stable up to March 2013
(throughout the incentivised data collection phase)
(ﬁgure 3A). The proportion of patients who were
deemed ‘harm-free’ in this subgroup did not reach the
goal of 95%.
In all submitting trusts (including the initial Safety
Express subgroup), the proportion of acute patients
reported as receiving harm-free care rose from 86.5%
January 2011 to 90.2% by July 2011 during Safety
Express. This increased further to 92.2% in July 2012,
and stabilised thereafter, during the incentivised data
collection phase (end of March 2013) (ﬁgure 3B).
Again, the 95% aspirational goal was not achieved.
DISCUSSION
This multimethod study of a large-scale, two-phase
improvement programme using an innovative approach
to harm-free care adds to the growing body of evidence
on large-scale programmes as a means of securing
change in healthcare. We set out to assess the extent to
which the harm-free care programme met its aims and
the inﬂuences on the achievement of those aims. We
found that the programme struggled in developing a
shared national, regional and locally aligned focus for
the harm-free care concept during phase I, with policy
turbulence a major inﬂuence in frustrating goal
achievement. The goal of establishing a measurement
system for harm-free care was achieved, but in the face
of considerable challenge. Whether the third and ﬁnal
goal of improved clinical outcomes was achieved proved
difﬁcult to determine. These ﬁndings offer valuable
learning about the design and conduct of large-scale
Figure 3 (A) Per cent harm-free care over time for patient
entries submitted from the initial Safety Express (‘phase I’)
cohort in January 2011 over time, until the end of the
incentivised data collection period (‘phase II’) plotted as a
P prime (P′) chart. (P′ chart showing per cent of patients from
the initial cohort of Safety Express (‘phase I’) organisations
experiencing harm-free care as defined by the NHS Safety
Thermometer, presented over time. These data are plotted as
a P′ chart; a type of control chart used for time-series data
with a large denominator. Individual data points represent the
% of patients in the cohort who received harm-free care each
month; in January 2011, this was 85.1%. In March 2013, this
was 91.4%. Control limits are used to apply control chart rules
to detect special cause. The original plot of these data
highlighted three distinct phases, indicated by the readjusted
mean line). (B) Per cent harm-free care over time for patient
entries from all submitting acute care trusts over time, from
the beginning of the ‘Safety Express’ period (‘phase I’) to the
end of the incentivised data collection period (‘phase II’)
plotted as a P′ chart (P′ chart showing per cent of patients
experiencing harm-free care (as defined by the NHS Safety
Thermometer) while an inpatient in an acute bed, at any
submitting NHS Trust, presented over time. Similar to (A),
these data are plotted as a P′ chart. Individual data points
represent the % of patients who received harm-free care each
month; in January 2011, this was 86.5%. In March 2013, this
was 92.2%. Control limits are used to apply control chart rules
to detect special cause. The original plot of these data
highlighted three distinct phases, indicated by the readjusted
mean line).
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quality improvement programmes in healthcare. First,
this study illustrates the importance of signiﬁcant
upfront investment when launching new data collection
tools based on novel concepts, especially when such
tools seek to standardise the measures used across
diverse settings. Second, it suggests that engagement in
voluntary efforts such as quality improvement collabora-
tives may be contingent on relatively stable organisa-
tional and broader institutional contexts: participation
and engagement in Safety Express remained patchy
throughout its history. It was not until broader structures
had settled, and a ﬁnancial incentive for data collection
was introduced in the second phase of the programme,
that the reach and consistency of data submission
improved. Third, this study illustrates the challenges in
interpreting evidence relating to large-scale improve-
ment. There is some indication that the proportion of
patients experiencing harm-free care increased over the
both phases of the programme, but trends over time in
the aggregate submissions must be interpreted cau-
tiously since the same organisations did not submit con-
sistently over time nor did those who were submitting do
so consistently, and case-mix varied over time.
One potentially tempting conclusion from this study is
that the ﬁrst phase of the programme was unnecessary
since improved consistency of data submission did not
occur until the second phase, which ﬁnancially incenti-
vised data collection. This second phase also saw pos-
sible improvements in clinical outcomes, even though
little improvement support was available. Such a conclu-
sion might suggest that future efforts to secure improve-
ment should focus primarily on ﬁnancial incentives,
bypassing the messier and more uncertain path of volun-
tary, collaborative cooperation. But such an argument
neglects the important developmental role played by the
ﬁrst phase. Without this, the second phase might have
been foundered.
The developmental role of the ﬁrst phase was
especially critical in developing the NHS Safety
Thermometer. Though quality improvement projects
are known to be prone to measurement and data collec-
tion problems of various kinds,30 39 40 the challenges in
developing measures and securing legitimacy are
seldom reported. The concepts behind the NHS Safety
Thermometer were novel, emphasising a patient-
centred approach that required rethinking of traditional
metrics and methods of data collection and display.
Signiﬁcant technical and social innovation was required
to maximise the chance that the data would be
regarded as credible while minimising the risk that data
would be too irksome or burdensome to collect.41
Despite the level of investment and testing, some con-
cerns about consistency, relevance and fairness endured
among those submitting data, as has been found
elsewhere.42
The ﬁrst phase of the programme may have been
important in developing approaches, deﬁnitions and
tools, but less clear was the success of the collaborative
model in securing change. Though the harm-free care
concept was broadly recognised by Safety Express partici-
pants as an original and ingenious way to think about
patient safety, none of the regions met the engagement
metrics; ability to engage was adversely affected by con-
textual inﬂuences, including massive system instability
that contributed to distraction, diminished energy and
voids of leadership.43 It is also likely that the number of
participants was too low to achieve the necessary
momentum in an area the size of England. Further com-
plicating engagement was the variation that existed
between regions and between organisations in their
approach to implementation. Better understanding of
such variation might have enabled the national pro-
gramme team to undertake a baseline assessment and
codesign a bespoke programme with each locality. These
ﬁndings afﬁrm earlier evidence,14 39 44 indicating that
quality improvement collaboratives may have some dis-
tinctive strengths but are far from a straightforward solu-
tion. It adds to this evidence in demonstrating that the
potential of collaboratives may be heavily contingent on
their political, economic and social contexts. Simply put,
though they may have advantages over more coercive
methods for making change,45 their success is likely to
depend on a supportive outer context. Better under-
standing of how and when collaboratives are the right
approach is an especially important goal given the
known risks and limitations associated other means of
achieving change, including those associated with use of
ﬁnancial incentives.46
A limitation of our study is that it was not possible to
conduct a process evaluation of the incentivised data col-
lection phase. This means that it is not easy to identify
the mechanisms that might have contributed to the pos-
sible improvements in proportion of harm-free care that
appear to have coincided with the introduction of the
data collection requirement. One possibility is that the
improvement observed was part of secular trend that was
occurring anyway.47 Another is that the observed
improvement is simply an artefact of the data collection
process; as data collection expanded, the case-mix
became more diverse and included a higher proportion
of patients at lower risk of the four harms. A further pos-
sibility the introduction of ﬁnancial incentives encour-
aged some form of gaming,48 though there is no direct
evidence of this. Finally, it is possible that the observed
change was real: that clinical teams did use the NHS
Safety Thermometer as intended, recognising the value
of a harm-free approach and using the data displays to
identify where practice was falling short and making
changes. Such an interpretation is consistent with the
general observation that data plus feedback can act as
an intervention, revealing unwarranted variations in
practices, processes and outcomes and helping to
inform targets for improvement.49 50
Limitations of this study include its reliance on clinical
outcome data reported to the programme by the partici-
pating sites: the data were not independently collected,
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nor was it possible to engage in veriﬁcation or validation
exercises. We interviewed all those who volunteered and
sought disconﬁrming evidence where possible, but it is
possible that those interviewed were primarily those with
more positive views, since those participating in the col-
laborative were, almost by deﬁnition, more engaged.
The online survey did provide another opportunity to
contribute, but it was still vulnerable to capturing the
views of the more engaged. It is not clear how generalis-
able the ﬁndings will be to other contexts.
These ﬁndings offer important lessons for large-scale
improvement programmes. They show that the effort
and time required to reach and implement an agreed
approach to measurement for improvement, particularly
when the measures are novel, should not be underesti-
mated. Development of measurement systems requires
cultural change and technical leadership. It is likely that
at least 6 months is needed before an improvement pro-
gramme starts to allow systems to be optimised. Even
then, contestation about data deﬁnitions and symptoms
about data collection burden may persist and should be
anticipated. The collaborative model may have rich
potential as a design and developmental phase in
large-scale improvement programmes, but may not on
its own produce change when external contexts are
unfavourable.
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